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This paper examines the effects of strategic alliances on non-financial firms’ bank 
loan financing. We construct several measures to capture firms’ alliance activities 
using the frequency of alliance activities, the prominence of the alliance partner 
and the relative networking position in the overall alliance network. We find that 
firms with active alliance involvement experience a lower cost of debt from 
banks. We also document that allying with a prestigious partner (ie S&P 500 
firms) can provide an endorsement effect and benefit the borrowers by reducing 
the price of bank loans. Moreover, a borrowing firm positioned at the centre of an 
alliance network enjoys a lower cost of bank loans. Finally, we find that 
borrowing firms with alliance experience are less likely to use collateral and 
covenants in their loan contracts. 
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Onnistuvatko yritykset pienentämään pankkilainan 
kustannuksia strategisten liittoutumien avulla? 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 4/2011 
Yiwei Fang – Bill Francis – Iftekhar Hasan – Haizhi Wang 




Tässä empiirisessä työssä tarkastellaan, onnistuvatko rahoitussektorin ulkopuoli-
set yritykset pienentämään pankkilainoituksen kustannuksia strategisten 
liittoutumien avulla. Tutkimuksessa yritysten välistä strategista liittoutumista mi-
tataan vaihtoehtoisesti liittoutumispyrkimysten yleisyydellä, yhteistyöosapuolen 
asemalla ja kunkin osapuolen suhteellisella sijainnilla yhteistyösuhteet kattavassa 
verkostossa. Tutkimustulosten mukaan yritykset, joilla on aktiivinen yhteistyö-
verkosto, onnistuvat pienentämään pankkilainan kustannuksia. Tuloksista ilmenee 
myös, että yhteistyö arvovaltaisen liittolaisen, esimerkiksi S&P 500 -yrityksen, 
kanssa antaa lainanottajalle myönteistä julkisuutta, mikä puolestaan laskee 
lainanottajan pankkilainastaan maksamaa korkoa. Lisäksi yhteistyöverkoston kes-
kiössä sijaitsevat yritykset saavat tulosten mukaan lainaa pankista halvemmalla 
kuin muut. Toisaalta onnistuneiden liittoutumien tapauksessa lainaa hakevien yri-
tysten lainasopimuksissa käytetään keskimäärin vähemmän vakuuksia ja kiinni-
tyksiä. 
 
Avainsanat: pankkilainan kustannukset, strategiset yritysliitot, hyödykemarkkinoi-
den yrityssuhteet 
 
JEL-luokittelu: G21, G30, D82, D85  
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As an inter-firm organizational form, the importance of strategic alliances in 
American industry has been increasing sharply (Lerner and Rajan, 2006). 
Commonly defined as voluntarily initiated organizational agreements between 
firms, corporate alliances bring together otherwise legally independent firms to 
share the costs and benefits of a mutually beneficial activity (Chan et al, 1997). 
Corporate alliances allow the participating firms to gain access to complementary 
resources and strengthen their competitive positions (Gulati, 1995; Baum et al, 
2000). More importantly, strategic alliances provide another important option for 
firms to grow (Habib and Mella-Barral, 2006; Lindsey, 2008; Robinson, 2008). 
While a large amount of management literature has explored the patterns, 
motivations, and benefits for firms entering into alliance agreements (Gulati, 
1995; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Das et al, 1998; Stuart et al, 1999; 
Lavie and Rosenkope, 2006), knowledge is still scant regarding the financial 
consequences of corporate alliance activities (Lerner and Rajan, 2006). 
  The main point of this paper is to investigate whether and to what extent non-
financial firms’ alliance activities affect their bank financing. We examine several 
aspects of corporate alliance activities, and relate them to both price and non-price 
terms of bank loans. We collect a sample of US public firms that received bank 
loans during 1991 to 2007 from Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan database. 
Relying on the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum (SDC) Joint Ventures database, 
we identify whether our sample firms engaged in any alliance partnerships within 
three years prior to the loan initiations. For the borrowers involved in alliances, 
we trace each pair of the partners and construct several measures to capture the 
frequency of alliance activities and the prominence of the alliance partners. In 
addition, borrowing from graph theory, we conduct network analysis and 
construct measures of sample borrowing firms’ relative network position. We 
investigate the influences of various measures of borrowing firms’ alliance 
activities on the cost of bank loans as well as non-price contractual loan terms. 
  Consistent with our predictions, we find that firms actively involved in 
alliance activities experience a significantly lower cost of bank debt compared 
with the group of firms without any alliance experience. It is plausible that the 
choices of entering into alliance agreements are endogenously determined and 
related to certain firm and industry characteristics. Therefore, we use the 
propensity score-matching method to form a matching sample from both 
treatment (ie, firms with alliance experience) and non-treatment (ie, firms without 
alliance experience) groups on a set of observable characteristics to remove the 
relevant differences. Our main findings based on the above matching sample do 
not change in a material way. We further look at the prominence of alliance 
partners, and document that allying with an S&P 500 company is associated with  
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a lower cost of bank loans. We also find that borrowing firms with alliance 
experience are less likely to use collateral and covenants in the loan contracts. 
  Although network analysis is somewhat new to finance literature, it has been 
well adapted to analyzing the network among venture capitalists (Hochberg et al, 
2007), the connection of stocks in the stock markets (Tse et al, 2010), and the 
social network among top executives (Fracassi and Tate, 2010). Our network 
measures capture the relative position of a particular firm in the product-market 
network and yield striking results. Our findings indicate that borrowing firms 
central to the network receive a lower cost of bank loans. We recognize that our 
network measures may capture the size effect in the sense that larger firms may 
participate in more alliances and tend to be at the center of the network. Similarly, 
our network measures may also capture other firm or industry characteristics. To 
address this issue, we employ a two-stage regression procedure following Yu 
(2008). In the first-stage regression, we regress our network measures on firm 
size, proxy for firm growth opportunity, several industry characteristics, and year 
dummies. Then we take the residuals from the first-stage regression as alternative 
measures of alliance network position (ie, residual measures), which represent the 
network effect that cannot be explained by certain observable firm and industry 
characteristics. Our findings based on residual measures are quite robust. 
  We believe our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. 
First, our findings manifest a robust link between the product market and the 
capital market. The existing literature focuses on the strategic aspects of corporate 
alliances (Gulati et al, 2000). Our paper provides new insights into the financial 
consequences of the inter-organizational agreements. Second, we emphasize the 
important role of the corporate network in firms’ financial activities (Hochberg et 
al, 2007; Lindsey, 2008). The inter-firm agreements form a widespread network 
for participants to share and access crucial information, and the structure of the 
network also controls and directs the flows of information. Being at the center of 
the corporate network will increase a firm’s visibility and reduce the information 
asymmetry problem, which consequently lead to a lower cost of bank loans. 
Third, consistent with the existing research (Stuart et al, 1999), we provide 
additional evidence that allying with prestigious partners will benefit borrowers in 
terms of a lower cost of financing. 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief 
review of the related literature. Section 3 details our data-collection and sample-
construction procedures as well as our measurements of alliances activities. 




2 Literature  review 
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) conference in 
2002, corporate alliances can be defined as ‘a cooperative agreement between two 
or more firms, involving substantial investment, and lying between one extreme 
of full ownership by one firm of the others and the other extreme of a short-term, 
arm’s length contract between the firms’ (Lerner and Rajan, 2006). If one thinks 
of market transactions on a spectrum from ‘arm’s length’ to ‘relational’, strategic 
alliances are typically viewed as the latter case. Corporate alliances involve 
substantial relation-specific investments and long-standing cooperative 
mechanisms, blurring firms’ boundaries through a network of relationships that 
can be an important source of value (Garvey, 1995; Baker et al, 2002; Gay and 
Dousset, 2005). 
  A large amount of management literature has explored the causes and 
consequences of corporate alliances, providing significant insights into this 
increasingly important phenomenon. For example, the literature has documented 
that strategic alliances can be motivated by gaining market power, accessing 
complementary resources, exploiting firm-specific competencies, or reducing 
environmental uncertainties (Kogut, 1988; Burgers et al, 1993). By participating 
in alliance activities, firms can gain advantages such as scale and scope 
economies and knowledge acquisition, and achieve strategic objectives such as 
risk sharing and outsourcing part of the value chain (Gulati et al, 2000). 
Organizational scholars have also emphasized the signaling value of young firms 
having prominent affiliations to key external resource holders (Podolny, 1993; 
Podolny et al, 1996; Stuart et al, 1999; Gulati and Higgins, 2003). Much of the 
research argues that the value that accrues to a firm in an alliance depends not 
only upon its own endowment, but also on its partners as well as on the social 
network in which it is embedded (Baum et al, 2000; Das and Teng, 2000; Gulati 
et al, 2000). 
  The finance literature has recognized the importance of strategic alliances 
only in recent years. Among a relatively small number of studies that directly 
examine the financial consequences of corporate alliances, Chan et al (1997) are 
the first to document the wealth-creation effects of strategic alliances. Allen and 
Phillips (2000) investigate block ownership purchasing by corporations and 
document significant increases in targets’ stock prices and operating profitability 
when such purchases are combined with product–market relationships (ie, 
strategic alliances). Other research has shown that strategic alliances involving 
equity stakes can be used as an effective way to deter entrance (Chen and Ross, 
2000; Mathews, 2006). The literature also suggests that strategic alliances are the 
dominant source of external financing for biotech companies to fund their 
research and development (R&D), especially when public market financing is  
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diminished (Lerner et al, 2003). Nicholson et al (2005) develop a signaling model 
of strategic alliances and demonstrate that in an environment with imperfect 
information, allying with prestigious partners can signal the quality and future 
growth potential of focal firms, and enable them to receive a substantially higher 
valuation from venture capitalists and IPO markets. Additionally, another paper 
by Lindsey (2008) finds that two entrepreneurial firms are more likely to form 
alliances if they share a common venture capitalist. 
  While the existing finance literature has explored some issues related to 
corporate alliances, evidence is still scant with respect to the financial 
consequences of firms’ alliance activities (Lerner and Rajan, 2006). In this study, 
we empirically investigate the influences of strategic alliances on the price and 
non-price terms of bank loans, and offer some new insights. There are several 
reasons why the alliance activities of borrowing firms may affect bank loan 
financing. First, alliance activities influence firm risk and future cash flows, which 
will consequently be factored into the loan contracts (Strahan, 1999). Strategic 
decisions usually involve choices regarding the investment of organizational 
resources (Schendel and Patton, 1978) given uncertainty about future outcomes 
(Bettis, 1982). Participating in an alliance agreement can be viewed as buying a 
valuable option for firms to exercise later (Bodnaruk et al, 2009). The real option 
adds value to firms engaged in alliance activities (Chan et al, 1997), especially 
when they operate in industries with significant dynamism. In addition, firms can 
achieve better performance through synergy gains from economies of scope and 
scale and enhanced market competitive positions (Kogut, 1988; Baum et al, 
2000). Supporting these arguments, some studies (Chan et al, 1997; Johnson and 
Houston, 2000; Bodnaruk et al, 2009) find a significant and positive market 
reaction to the announcement of alliances and joint ventures. Consequently, firms 
actively involved in alliance activities will be less likely to default from creditors’ 
perspective. 
  Second, strategic alliances can be a source of information that helps to 
alleviate the asymmetric information problem. Commercial banks rely on their 
expertise in collecting firm-specific information to address adverse selection and 
moral hazard (Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984). Existing 
research documents that alliance activities can result in information spillover 
(Anand and Khanna, 2000; Dessein, 2005; Gomes-Casseres et al, 2006), and 
increased information flows among firms may well inform potential lenders about 
the riskiness and future prospects of borrowing firms, thus reducing the adverse 
selection problem. Moreover, firms frequently involved in alliances are likely to 
be monitored and disciplined by their partners through reciprocal business 
interactions (Bodnaruk et al, 2009). Firms are more concerned about building 
reputation and credit records (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999; Thorelli, 2006), 
which consequently alleviate the moral hazard problem as well.  
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  The third reason is related to signaling. When information regarding firm 
quality is not sufficient or cannot be observed directly, firms need to undertake 
certain activities to alleviate uncertainty, make potential investors aware of firm 
potential, and convey their superior and private information to the market. 
Podolny (1993) argues that evaluators and resource holders routinely take into 
account the characteristics of firm partners as validation of the firm’s investment 
opportunities. To put it another way, borrowers will benefit from having a 
prestigious partner who can certify the quality of the borrowing firms and thus 
reduce the cost of external financing. The signaling and certification effects 
provided by prominent partners have been well established in the finance 
literature (Carter and Manaster, 1990; Carter et al, 1998; Fang, 2005; Nicholson et 
al, 2005). In line with the existing literature, we predict that borrowing firms 
affiliated with prominent partners will be able to obtain a lower cost of bank 
financing. 
  Lastly, corporate alliances can bring multiple value-adding network effects to 
the participating firms (Robinson and Stuart, 2000; Garmaise and Moskowitz, 
2003; Allen and Babus, 2008). For example, the alliance network enables firms to 
access valuable resources not only through their current partnerships but also 
through past relations or indirect connections (eg, partners’ partners). It is 
plausible that an alliance network among non-financial firms can bridge potential 
pairs of debtors and creditors, and thus facilitate firms to gain access to cheaper 
financing resources (Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2003). As another example, 
alliance networks may serve as an effective governance mechanism (Robinson 
and Stuart, 2007). A firm will be observed repeatedly and put under the spotlight 
if it is at the center of the network. Under such circumstances, the firm is less 
likely to behave opportunistically because non-cooperative activities can be 
observed and punished. 
 
 
3  Data and methodology 
3.1 Sample  selection  and dependent measures 
We rely on three main databases to construct our sample, namely Dealscan, 
Compustat, and the SDC Joint Ventures database. Dealscan is our primary source 
of bank loan information for public firms in the US.
1 Note that bank loans in 
Dealscan are recorded at both ‘deal’ level and ‘acility’ level. Following most 
studies in the literature, we use a facility as the unit of observation to collect 
information on price and non-price contractual terms. The loan price recorded as 
                                                 
1 See Strahan (1999) for a detailed description of the Dealscan database.  
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all-in spread drawn (AISD) is defined as the mark-up over LIBOR. We also 
retrieve the non-pricing terms including the usage of collateral and covenants in 
the loan contracts. 
  After we obtain our loan sample, we match it with Compustat to obtain 
borrowers’ annual accounting information (Chava and Roberts, 2008).
2 We 
exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) and utility firms (SIC codes 
4000–4999). To ensure the accounting variables of a fiscal year can be accurately 
matched with the calendar date of a loan origination, we adopt the method 
proposed by Bharath et al (2010). To be specific, for a particular loan made in 
calendar year t, we use the accounting data of fiscal year t if the loan origination 
date is 6 months later than the fiscal year ending month; otherwise we use the 
accounting data of fiscal year t–1. The matching process yields 18,118 loan 
facilities by 3,783 unique US public firms. 
  We use the SDC Joint Ventures database to identify the alliance activities of 
our sample firms in the three-year period preceding loan originations. We focus 
on various types of alliances including research and development agreements, 
marketing agreements, manufacturing agreements, supply agreements, licensing 
agreements, and distribution agreements. To construct measures on the overall 
alliance network and identify borrowers’ relative positions in the network, we 
keep all the alliance deals during the same three-year window preceding loan 
originations for the borrowing firms in our sample, regardless of whether the 
alliance deals are made by the borrowers or not. 
 
 
3.2  Measuring alliance activities 
We focus on a three-year window preceding a particular loan origination and 
construct several measures to capture the alliance activities of our sample firms. 
First, we define a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if a borrower has 
participated in at least one alliance deal during the three-year window, and zero 
otherwise. Second, we count the number of alliances and take the natural 
logarithm to normalize the distribution. Third, we define two dummy variables 
capturing the prominence of a borrowing firm and its alliance partner (Carter et al, 
1998; Stuart et al, 1999). More specifically, we add indicators on whether a 
borrower or its alliance partner is an S&P 500 firm in the three-year window. 
 
 
                                                 
2 We thank Michael Roberts for kindly providing us with the matching list of Dealscan and 
Compustat.  
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3.3  Measuring alliance networks 
Borrowing from graph theory, we conduct a network analysis to identify an 
individual borrower’s relative position in the alliance network. The advantage of 
this method lies in its ability to take into consideration the dyadic relationships as 
well as the overall structure of the interrelated alliance relationships.
3 The first 
step in measuring a network is to construct an adjacency matrix, the cells of which 
reflect whether there is a direct tie between each pair of nodes in the network. 
Moreover, we construct the adjacency matrix on a yearly basis using all the 
alliance activities in year t-2, year t-1, and year t.
4 For example, the network 
matrix of year 2007 and related network measures are based on all the alliances 
formed from 2005 to 2007. Note that both private and public firms involved in the 
alliances are considered in the matrix construction to obtain a broad network. 
However, we only measure network characteristics for those public borrowers in 




3.3.1 Degree  centrality 
Degree centrality is the most straightforward measure to capture whether a node is 
in the central position or ‘in the thick of things’ (Scott, 2000). Degree centrality 
counts the number of nodes to which a focal node is adjacent. Formally, let pij = 1 
if there is one alliance relationship between firm i and j, and pij = 0 otherwise. 
Then, firm i’s degree centrality is measured as Σjpij/n. Because degree centrality is 
a function of network size, which varies over time in our data set due to newly 
formed partnerships, we divide the degree centrality by the maximum possible 
degrees in an n-actor network to normalize the measure. Intuitively, a larger 
degree centrality means more partnerships, greater popularity, and greater 
visibility in our context. 
 
 
3.3.2 Betweenness  centrality 
Betweenness centrality captures the extent to which a particular node lies between 
other nodes and makes pass-through communications within the network. A node 
with high betweenness centrality is assumed to play an important intermediary 
role and therefore is central to the network (Freeman, 1979). Firms with great 
                                                 
3 See Wasseman and Faust (1994) for a detailed introduction to social network analysis. 
4 Normally, the duration of an alliance agreement lasts for three to five years (Pangarkar, 2003). 
As robustness checks, we also construct our network measures based on one-year and five-year 
time windows. The results are qualitatively the same.  
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betweenness centrality can act as ‘brokers’ or ‘gatekeepers’ by bridging potential 
pairs of firms in the network. Consequently, firms with greater betweenness 
centrality can exploit more information and are more likely to exercise control 
over others. Formally, firm i’s betweenness centrality is calculated as the 
proportion of all the paths linking any two firms that pass through firm i. 
Similarly, we normalize the measure using the maximum possible betweenness 
degree in an n-actor network. 
 
 
3.3.3 Eigenvector  centrality 
Eigenvector centrality is a more sophisticated criterion to assess the importance of 
an individual node in the network. This measure considers both the number of 
connections and the relative importance of the connected nodes based on their 
degree centrality. Specifically, if we express the centrality of a particular node as 
the sum of its connections to other nodes weighted by their respective degree 
centrality, the solution to the system of equations equals the eigenvector 
associated with the largest eigenvalue of the standardized matrix of the network 
(Bonacich, 1972; Bonacich, 1987). Eigenvector centrality can be used to proxy 
the closeness of a particular firm to those firms central to the network. To put it 
another way, the eigenvector centrality associated with a firm gives a sense of 
how the firm is connected with other well-connected firms. We normalize the 
measure by the highest possible eigenvector centrality in an n-actor network. 
 
 
3.4 Control  variables 
In addition to our main measures of sample firms’ alliance activities, we enter two 
sets of control variables into the regression analysis to control for various loan 
features and firm characteristics that have been documented to be important 
determinants of loan contracts (Strahan, 1999). We retrieve other loan contractual 
terms such as loan size, maturity, syndicated loans, and loans with covenants from 
the Dealscan database. Loan size is measured as the natural logarithm of the dollar 
amount of a facility. We also use several indicator variables to capture different 
loan characteristics. Syndication is a dummy that takes the value of one when the 
loan is syndicated and zero otherwise. Collateral is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one when the loan is backed by collateral and zero otherwise. 
Covenant is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the loan includes 
covenants and zero otherwise. 
  We measure firm size as the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. We 
measure firm leverage as the total debt divided by the book value of total assets.  
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We include the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the growth potential of a 
particular firm. Himmelberg and Morgan (1995) argue that tangible assets reduce 
firm opaqueness and thereby increase a firm’s access to external capital. To 
account for asset opaqueness, we include asset tangibility measured as the ratio of 
tangible assets (ie, net property, plant and equipment net of depreciation plus 
inventories) to total assets. We control for firm profitability by using the profit 
margin calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA) to the book value of assets. We also calculate the 
modified Altman’s (1968) Z-score for our samples to gauge the likelihood of 
default for our sample borrowers. 
 
 
3.5  Sample description and univariate comparison 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables for our final sample. 
We perform a 98% winsorization of the data to deal with the problem of potential 
outliers. In Panel A (Table 1), we report summary statistics of the loan 
characteristics. The mean (median) AISD is 184 bps (175 bps), the mean facility 
amount is $227 million, and the maturity is 45 months on average. In addition, 
88% of our sample loan facilities are syndicated, 67% have covenants, and 75% 
are secured by collateral.
5 
  With respect to the firm characteristics (Panel B of Table 1), our sample firms 
have an average asset value of $2281 million, an average leverage ratio of 0.29, 
and an average market-to-book ratio of 1.69. In addition, we report that the 
modified Altman’s (1968) Z-score is 1.93 on average, and the mean credit rating 
score of the sample borrowers is 2.99. The summary statistics of our sample are 
generally comparable with other recent studies using LPC bank loan data 
(Strahan, 1999; Graham et al, 2008; Bharath et al, 2010). 
  Panel C of Table 1 reports various measures of alliance activities for our 
sample firms. About 25% of the loans in our sample are granted to borrowers with 
alliance experience, and the mean frequency of alliance participations is 3.29. 
Moreover, 36% of the sample borrowers are S&P 500 companies, and 32% have 
alliance partners that are S&P 500. The relative network positions of the 
borrowers are measured by degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and 
eigenvector centrality, the means of which are 0.008, 0.031, and 0.437, 
respectively. 
  We conduct univariate comparison tests to examine whether previous alliance 
experience makes any difference in terms of the cost of bank loans (AISD in 
                                                 
5 Out of 18,118 observations in our sample, only 13,212 have collateral information in LPC. 
Following Bharath et al (2009), we treat such loans as unsecured. We also add an indicator 
(Collateral missing) in the regression analysis if the information on collateral is missing.  
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logs). We partition our sample into two sub-groups: borrowers with and without 
alliance experience in the three-year window preceding the loan originations. 
Table 2 presents comparison tests across different years during our sample period, 
whereas Table 3 reports similar tests across different industries defined at the 1-
digit SIC level. The results are quite consistent in that the sample borrowing firms 
with alliance experience are associated with a lower cost of bank loans. The 
difference of 0.398 in the logged AISD is both statistically significant (p < 0.01) 
and economically significant (51 bps) for the entire sample. 
 
 
4 Empirical  results 
4.1  The effect of alliance activities on loan pricing 
Table 4 presents the regression results relating loan pricing to firms’ involvement 
in the alliance activities. We use an indicator variable to capture whether a 
borrowing firm has any alliance experience in the 3-year window before a 
particular loan origination. Column 1 in Table 4 enters the alliance dummy along 
with a set of variables controlling for various firm characteristics. Column 2 adds 
a set of variables controlling for different loan features in addition to the alliance 
dummy, and Column 3 is the full model. For all the model specifications, we use 
AISD in logs as the dependent variable, and control for year fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects at the 4-digit SIC level. We also enter the number of lenders 
and an indicator for missing information about collateral (results not reported). 
We find consistent results across all the model specifications that those borrowing 
firms with alliance experience enjoy a lower cost of bank loans (p < 0.01). Using 
model 3 as an example (Column 3 in Table 4), the coefficient of the alliance 
dummy is -0.0273 (p < 0.01), which means, on average, the loan price for firms 
with alliance experience is 2.73% lower than those for firms without any alliance 
experience, all else being equal. 
  With regard to the other control variables, we generally find the results to be 
consistent with the existing literature (Strahan, 1999). For example, the leverage 
ratio is positively associated with the loan spread because higher leverage ratios 
imply reduced debt capacity and a higher likelihood of defaulting. Consequently, 
borrowing firms with higher leverage usually pay higher interest to obtain bank 
loans. Additionally, higher asset tangibility and higher profitability are associated 
with a lower loan spread. The MTB (market-to-book ratio) is a proxy for firm 
growth potential and is negatively correlated with the loan price. Strahan (1999) 
argues that growth firms may have more uncertainty since their value depends 
more on profit growth than on the current cash flow, which indicates a positive 
relation between the market-to-book ratio and the loan spread. However, Graham  
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et al (2008) explain that if the tangibility of book assets is controlled, the market-
to-book ratio should negatively affect the loan spread because it represents the 
additional value over book assets that debt holders can access in the event of 
default. It appears that our finding on MTB is consistent with Graham et al’s 
(2008) argument. 
  Regarding the variables measuring various loan contractual terms, we find 
that the loan size (as proxied by the natural logarithm of facility dollar amount) 
and loan maturity are positively correlated with the loan spread. The presence of 
collateral is positively correlated with the loan price. It is plausible that collateral 
is used as a contractual mechanism to mitigate the moral hazard problem and also 
signal lower credibility of the borrowing firms (Besanko and Thakor, 1987; 
Bharath et al, 2010). In addition, we find that syndicated loans have a lower loan 
spread, which is consistent with the risk-sharing motive of banks to provide funds 
jointly to borrowing firms (Lerner, 1994). 
 
 
4.2  Endogeneity of the alliance formation – propensity 
score-matching approach 
In observational studies, it can be problematic to make causal inference by simply 
comparing a treatment group (eg, borrowers with alliance experience) with a non-
treatment group (eg, borrowers without alliance experience). Although we have 
shown that borrowing firms with alliance experience enjoy a low cost of bank 
loans, we recognize that firms self-selecting into alliance agreements may possess 
certain characteristics related to low costs of private debt financing. Therefore, the 
alliance dummy becomes endogenous in the regression model and leads to biased 
estimations. The propensity score-matching method is especially useful for 
pairing treatment and non-treatment groups on a set of observable characteristics 
to remove the relevant differences. As shown by Dehejia and Wahba (2002), the 
propensity score-matching method provides a natural weighting scheme that 
yields unbiased estimates of the treating impact. To perform the matching, we 
employ the propensity score-matching technique described by Heckman et al 
(1997) and Heckman et al (1998), which has been widely used in recent studies 
(Drucker and Puri, 2005; Bharath et al, 2010). 
  The propensity score, the conditional treatment probability of having alliance 
experience, is estimated through a probit model on a multi-dimensional set of 
pretreatment characteristics. Building on existing theories and empirical evidence 
(Kogut, 1988; Burgers et al, 1993), we include firm leverage, market-to-book 
ratio, asset tangibility, profitability, year fixed effects, and industry fixed effects 
to calculate the propensity score for each borrowing firm our sample. For each 
loan facility in the treatment group, we calculate a propensity score and identify n  
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observations as the nearest neighbors in the non-treatment group. We compare the 
mean difference of the treatment and control groups based on the propensity 
score-matching method, and report the results in Table 5. More specifically, for 
each observation in the treatment group, we perform one-one, one-five and one-
ten matches. Across the three types of matching criteria, borrowing firms with 
alliance experience have a consistently and significantly lower loan spread than 
the control group. 
 
 
4.3  The effects of the frequency of alliance activities on 
loan pricing 
We further explore the relation between the frequency of a firm’s alliance 
participation and its cost of bank loans. We use a count measure to gauge the 
number of alliance deals for a borrowing firm within the 3-year period preceding 
a particular loan origination, and we also take the natural logarithm of the count to 
normalize the distribution. Table 6 presents the regression results relating bank 
loan pricing to the frequency of alliance activities. We use both the count measure 
(Column 1) and the logged count measure (Column 2) as the dependent variables. 
In Columns 1 and 2, we report a significantly negative relation between the loan 
price and the frequency of loan participations (p < 0.01). The result in Table 6 
indicates that, ceteris paribus, borrowing firms that actively participate in alliances 
enjoy a lower cost of bank loans. 
 
 
4.4  The prominence of alliance partners and loan pricing 
In this section, we examine whether the prominence of alliance partners can serve 
as certification to mitigate the asymmetric information problem and help the 
borrowing firms to obtain a low cost of bank financing. We define an alliance 
partner as a prominent partner if it is an S&P 500 company within the three-year 
window, as detailed previously. It is plausible that the borrowing firm has 
sufficient reputation and the certification effect of the alliance partner will be less 
important under such circumstances. We thereby define a dummy to indicate 
whether a particular borrowing firm is an S&P 500 company. In this way, we can 
separate out the effects of the prominence of the borrowers and their alliance 
partners. 
  Table 7 presents the regression analysis relating the loan price to the 
prominence of alliance partners. The result in Column 1 of Table 7 indicates that 
allying with an S&P 500 company is associated with a lower loan price, 
controlling for the other variables. Having an S&P 500 alliance partner will  
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reduce the loan spread by 5.04% (p < 0.01). Consistent with our prediction, the 
indicator of being an S&P 500 company for the borrowing firm itself is also 
negatively correlated with the loan price. We then partition our sample according 
to whether a borrowing firm is an S&P 500 company. Columns 2 and 3 present 
the results based on two sub-samples. It appears that the indicator of allying with 
an S&P 500 company is only significant (Column 2 of Table 7) when the 
borrowing firm is not an S&P 500 company. In other words, if the borrowing firm 
has sufficient reputation capital at stake, the certification effect of having a 




4.5  Alliance network positions and loan pricing 
Inter-firm alliances establish a network allowing firms to gain access to various 
resources through a web of relationships. However, crucial resources are not 
equally available to all the members of the network (Gulati et al, 2000). Rather, 
resources can be accessed differently depending on how a firm is connected to 
others in the network. Moreover, the network can function as governance and 
monitoring mechanisms, but the effectiveness of such mechanisms differs across 
the network with firms central to the network experiencing a strong disciplinary 
effect (Robinson and Stuart, 2000; Baker et al, 2002; Robinson, 2008). In this 
section, we investigate the relation between a firm’s relative position in the 
network and its cost of bank debt. We borrow from the social network literature 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994) and employ three measures, namely degree 
centrality, betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality, to gauge the relative 
network positions of our sample borrowers. 
  Table 8 presents the regression results relating loan price to the three 
measures of network positions. It is arguable that a firm’s network position may 
be related to other firm and industry characteristics. For example, a large firm 
may establish more alliance relations with other firms, and consequently be 
located central to the network. To address this issue, we follow Yu (2008) to 
regress three centrality measures on firm size, market-to-book ratio, year fixed 
effects, and industry-specific factors including marketing competition and 
technological instability.
6 We then obtain three residual measures as robustness 
                                                 
6 We obtain market share information from the 1990, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2002 editions of 
Ward’s Business Directory, which rank firms by sales within four-digit SIC codes. For each four-
digit SIC industry, we calculate the average market share change over a ten-year period as a proxy 
for market competition. We obtain industry research and development (R&D) expenditures from 
the National Science Foundation. For each four-digit SIC industry, we regress R&D expenditures 
on year dummies from 1972 to 2002, and then divide the standard errors of the slope coefficient by 
the mean industrial R&D expenditures. We use this measure as a proxy for industry-level 
technology instability (Tosi et al, 1973; Snyder and Glueck, 1982).  
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checks. The residual measures will reflect the portion of the raw centrality 
measures that cannot be explained by the abovementioned firm characteristics as 
well as economy-wide shocks and industry-specific factors. 
  In Columns 1–3 of Table 8, we enter three raw measures of network 
centrality, and in Columns 4–6, we enter three residual measures of network 
centrality. We find that, in general, a borrowing firm central to the network 
experiences a significantly lower cost of bank loans except for the eigenvector 
centrality (Columns 4 and 6). The results support the notion that a well-positioned 
firm will benefit from increased visibility and less information asymmetry. 
Moreover, centrally located firms are subject to more intense monitoring in the 
repeated interactions with other firms in the network, and thus have less incentive 
to behave opportunistically (Larson, 1992; Robinson and Stuart, 2000). Our 
findings show that both the raw and the residual measures of eigenvector 
centrality are insignificant in the regressions. Note that degree centrality and 
betweenness centrality measure how a firm is directly positioned in the network 
through direct ties with other firms and serves as a bridge to connect other firms, 
whereas eigenvector centrality measures the closeness of a borrower to those 
firms central to the network. Our results indicate that the beneficial effects of 
participation in the alliance network by our sample borrowing firms on the cost of 




4.6  The effect of alliance activities on the non-price terms 
of bank loans 
In this section, we turn to examine the relation between non-price contractual 
terms, focusing on the usage of collateral and covenants. Collateral is commonly 
used in bank loan contracts to alleviate the potential moral hazard problem, reduce 
the likelihood of misuse of the resources, and serve as a claim against negative 
consequences. Borrowing firms with poor prospects and necessitating intensive 
monitoring are more likely to use collateral to pledge external finance (Berger and 
Udell, 1990; Jimenez et al, 2006). We argue that alliance participation will 
increase the visibility of borrowing firms and enhance mutual monitoring and 
governance (Nicholson et al, 2005), and hypothesize that the likelihood of using 
collateral should be less for firms with alliance involvement, controlling all other 
things. 
  Column 1 of Table 9 presents the regression result based on a probit model 
linking the usage of collateral in the loan contracts to borrowing firms’ alliance 
experience. The dependent variable is an indicator of whether collateral is 
required in a particular loan contract, and we exclude those loan observations that  
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do not explicitly specify terms about collateral. We control for other firm 
characteristics and several loan features in the regression analysis along with year 
fixed effects and industry fixed effects. We find a negative relation between the 
usage of collateral in loan contracts and borrowing firms’ alliance experience 
(p < 0.1). Column 2 reports the marginal effects of those variables used in the 
probit model, which indicates that previous alliance experience of the sample 
borrowing firms reduces the likelihood of using collateral by 1.6%, all else being 
equal. 
  We also examine the effect of previous alliance experience on the usage of 
covenants in loan contracts. The presence of covenant provisions puts restrictions 
on firm behaviors to protect the claims of debt holders (ie, bank lenders), and the 
number of covenants generally increases with the need for monitoring (Rajan and 
Winton, 1995). Following Bradley and Roberts (2004), we construct three 
covenant indexes to capture the usage of covenants in loan contracts. To be 
specific, overall covenant intensity is the sum of general and financial covenants; 
general covenant intensity is the total number of general covenants; financial 
covenant intensity is the total number of financial covenants. 
  Columns 3–5 (Table 9) report the regression results using overall covenant 
intensity, general covenant intensity, and financial covenant intensity as 
dependent variables, respectively. Because these three measures are non-negative 
count variables, Poisson regression is used to conduct the analysis with the 
indicator of previous alliance experience being the main explanatory variable. We 
find that the alliance dummy is significantly negative in all three regression 
models. The results indicate that banks impose fewer covenants in the loan 




With increased competition in the product market, the collaborations among non-
financial firms have increased sharply during the past three decades. Strategic 
alliances as an inter-firm organizational form not only allow the participating 
firms to gain a broad array of resources, but also create a network to allow 
information to diffuse rapidly. A well-connected firm in the network can enhance 
its visibility, and thus reduce the information asymmetry with potential lenders 
and other stakeholders in the markets. Furthermore, it is less likely for a firm to 
behave opportunistically if the focal firm repeatedly engages in alliance activities 
with many other partners. The corporate finance literature has increasingly 
recognized the importance of strategic alliances (Lerner and Rajan, 2006). Our 
paper adds to the literature some new evidence and insights regarding the 
financial consequences of such inter-firm collaborations.  
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  We investigate whether borrowing firms’ alliance activities may affect the 
price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. Our research establishes a robust 
link between product-market relationships and non-financial firms’ activities in 
the financial markets. We document that borrowing firms actively involved in 
alliance activities experience a low cost of bank loans. We also take the necessary 
steps to address the endogeneity issue using the propensity score-matching 
method, and our results are robust to this specification. Borrowing from graph 
theory and building on the existing literature, we measure the relative positions of 
our sample firms in the alliance network, and the network analysis yields striking 
findings. We report that, in general, firms central to the network enjoy a low cost 
of bank loans. Moreover, we construct residual measures to gauge the portion of 
network effects that cannot be explained by firm and industry characteristics and 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.   Sample distribution and comparison tests across 
     different  years 
 
Table 2 reports the sample distribution across different years. Our sample consists of US public 
firms that obtained bank loans between 1991 and 2007 as recorded in Dealscan database. We 
partition our sample into two subsamples based on whether the borrowers have participated in at 
least one alliance deal during three years prior to starting date of the loan facility. This table also 
reports the mean AISD (in logs) for each subsample and the comparison tests (t-test) across 
different years. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Year 
Subsample for Borrowers with 
Alliance Experience 
Subsample for Borrowers 
without Alliance Experience 
Difference of 
AISD in Logs 
  N Log A I S DNL o g AISD t-test 
1991  53 5.195 462 5.195 0.067 
1992  100  4.885 530 5.163  0.278*** 
1993  158  4.599 612 5.121  0.522*** 
1994  257  4.516 802 4.923  0.407*** 
1995  244  4.538 720 4.850  0.312*** 
1996  287  4.641 928 4.968  0.327*** 
1997 348 4.486 1,231 4.912  0.427*** 
1998  333  4.748 964 5.017  0.269*** 
1999  280  4.826 927 5.194  0.368*** 
2000  370  4.697 815 5.116  0.419*** 
2001  393  4.619 755 5.157  0.538*** 
2002  362  4.695 774 5.220  0.526*** 
2003  337  4.789 776 5.252  0.463*** 
2004  254  4.549 904 5.094  0.545*** 
2005  256  4.631 911 4.940  0.309*** 
2006  218  4.548 762 4.871  0.324*** 
2007  216  4.510 779 4.953  0.443*** 




Table 3.   Sample distribution and comparison tests across 
     different  industries 
 
Table 3 reports the sample distribution across different industries. Our sample consists of US 
public firms that obtained bank loans between 1991 and 2007 as recorded in Dealscan database. 
We partition our sample into two subsamples based on whether the borrowers have participated in 
at least one alliance deal during three years prior to starting date of the loan facility. This table also 
reports the mean AISD (in logs) for each subsample and the comparison tests (t-test) across 
different industries. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
SIC 
Subsample for borrowers 
with Alliance Experience 
Subsample for borrowers 
without Alliance Experience 
Difference of 
AISD in Logs 
    N Log  AISD N Log  AISD  t-test 
1000-1999 297  4.773  1,224  5.025  0.252*** 
2000-2999 1,032  4.312  2,635  4.865  0.553*** 
3000-3999 1,619  4.630  4,521  5.071  0.441*** 
5000-5999 610  4.680  2,721  5.017  0.338*** 
7000-7999 652  4.947  1,574  5.189  0.242*** 
8000-8999  256 5.117 977 5.280  0.163*** 
Total  4,466 4.647 13,652 5.045 0.398*** 
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Table 4.   Regression relating loan spread to alliance 
     experience 
 
Table 4 provides the OLS regression relating cost of bank loans to our sample firms’ alliance 
experience three-year prior to the starting date of loan facilities. The dependent variable is all-in 
spread drawn (AISD) in logs. The main explanatory variable is an indicator of alliance experience, 
which takes the value one if a sample firm has participated in at least on alliance deal three-year 
prior to the starting date of a particular loan facility, and zero otherwise. We control for various 
firm-specific and loan-specific characteristics, and include industry fixed effects at 4-digit SIC 
level and year fixed effects for all model specifications. We include an indicator variable to 
capture missing information of collateral and the number of lenders in all model specifications 
(results not reported). Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Independent Variables  Dependent Variable: AISD in Logs 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Alliance dummy  -0.0388***  -0.1041***  -0.0273*** 
 (-3.4787)  (-9.6183)  (-2.6689) 
Firm characteristics     
Log (asset)  -0.2690***    -0.1596*** 
 (-68.1194)    (-29.2105) 
MTB -0.0854***    -0.0648*** 
 (-13.2078)    (-10.6777) 
Leverage 0.9340***    0.6935*** 
  (32.5601)  (26.3248) 
Tangibility -0.3569***    -0.2677*** 
 (-10.1754)    (-8.4617) 
Profitability -1.5001***    -1.1267*** 
 (-16.2588)    (-13.7115) 
Z-score -0.0550***    -0.0387*** 
  (-8.0507)  (-6.9962) 
Rating score  -0.0145***    -0.0130*** 
  (-7.2871)  (-7.1842) 
Loan characteristics     
Log (facility amount)    -0.1799***  -0.0665*** 
   (-38.4962)  (-12.1017) 
Log (maturity)    0.0971***  0.0630*** 
   (12.5781)  (8.6598) 
Collateral   0.7465***  0.5618*** 
   (60.6929)  (45.2116) 
Syndication   0.0346**  -0.0099 
   (2.2178)  (-0.6608) 
Covenant   -0.0043  -0.0195* 
   (-0.3459)  (-1.7031) 
Constant 6.8580***  5.0338***  5.9099*** 
 (177.6279)  (123.7576)  (120.8971) 
      
Year fixed effects  YES  YES  YES 
Industry fixed effects  YES  YES  YES 
      
N 17,302  17,584  16,802 
Adjusted R-squared  0.5622  0.5628  0.6380 
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Table 5.   Effect of alliance on loan spread-propensity score 
     match  estimation 
 
This table reports the average difference in loan spread of borrowers with alliances activities and 
borrowers without alliance activities. To examine mean AISD spread differences, we control for 
various borrower and lender characteristics: we compute propensity scores using the following 
probit model: 
 Alliance  =  β0 + Σβi(Borrewer_Characteristicsi) + Σβk(Controlsk) 
The dependent variable is Alliance, a dummy variable that equals one if the borrower has 
participated in any alliance during the past 3 years before the present loan, and 0 otherwise. The 
borrower characteristics include log of assets, profitability, tangibility, leverage, market to book 
ratio, and credit rating scores. Other controls include industry fixed effects at four-digit SIC code 
level and year fixed effects. To search for the matching firm(s), we use the NEAREST 
NEIGHBOR estimator. For each alliance loan, we obtain the n non-alliance loans with closest 
propensity scores and use the arithmetic average of AISD for these n non-alliance loans. We use 
n = 1, n = 10 and n = 50. For all matching methods, we present the sample averages of treated and 
control groups. Difference in log AISD is also reported with standard errors and t-statistics. *, **, 










Error  t-statistic 
Nearest neighbor (1 to 1 match)  4.647  4.718  -0.071**  0.026  -2.700 
Nearest neighbor (1 to 10 match)  4.647  4.790  -0.143***  0.017  -8.350 
Nearest neighbor (1 to 50 match)  4.647  4.799  -0.153***  0.016  -9.420 
  
28 
Table 6.   The effect of alliance frequency on loan spread 
 
This table provides the OLS regression relating cost of bank loans and alliance frequency. The 
dependent variable is log AISD (all-in spread drawn). Alliance frequency is measured as the 
number of alliance the borrower participated during the three years before loan facility starting 
date. Column 1 reports the regression with the raw number of alliances as the proxy for alliance 
frequency. Column 2 uses the logarithm of alliance number. We control various firm- and loan 
characteristics. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix. We control for various firm-specific 
and loan-specific characteristics, and include industry fixed effects at 4-digit SIC level and year 
fixed effects for all model specifications. Collateral missing dummy and number of lenders are 
included in the regressions but not reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Independent Variables  Dependent Variable: AISD in Logs 
 (1)  (2) 
Alliance number  -0.0080***   
 (-3.6235)   
Alliance number in log    -0.0610*** 
   (-3.6198) 
Firm characteristics    
Log (asset)  -0.1525***  -0.1507*** 
 (-12.5571)  (-12.4497) 
MTB -0.0953***  -0.0945*** 
 (-8.3070)  (-8.2418) 
Leverage 0.7918***  0.7897*** 
 (12.8989)  (12.8166) 
Tangibility -0.1970**  -0.1975** 
 (-2.2991)  (-2.2963) 
Profitability -1.1005***  -1.1079*** 
 (-6.2033)  (-6.2329) 
Z-score -0.0262***  -0.0269*** 
 (-2.6226)  (-2.6476) 
Rating score  -0.0170***  -0.0171*** 
 (-4.2570)  (-4.2866) 
Loan characteristics    
Log (facility amount)  -0.0702***  -0.0702*** 
 (-5.4607)  (-5.4590) 
Log (maturity)  0.0645***  0.0643*** 
 (4.7922)  (4.7690) 
Collateral 0.6012***  0.5998*** 
 (22.8390)  (22.7814) 
Syndication -0.0874**  -0.0870** 
 (-2.1973)  (-2.1859) 
Covenant 0.0615***  0.0621*** 
 (2.7087)  (2.7365) 
Constant 6.0016***  6.0401*** 
 (51.3234)  (51.6391) 
    
Year fixed effects  YES  YES 
Industry fixed effects  YES  YES 
    
N 4,124  4,124 
Adjusted R-squared  0.7184  0.7185 
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Table 7.   Effect of partner prominence on bank loan spread 
 
This table presents regression results relating cost of bank loans and alliance partner prominence. 
The dependent variable is log AISD (all-in spread drawn). We use S&P 500 to proxy the 
prominence of the borrower and its partner. “Partner S&P500” equals to one if the firm has a 
partner ranked in S&P500, zero otherwise. “Borrower S&P500” equals to one if the firm is ranked 
in S&P500, zero otherwise. Column 1 reports the regression based on the entire sample. Column 2 
reports the regression for the subsample where the borrowers are not S&P500. And Column 3 
reports the regression for the subsample where the borrowers themselves are S&P500. We control 
for various firm-level and loan-level characteristics. Variable definitions and measures are 
reported in Appendix. We control for various firm-specific and loan-specific characteristics, and 
include industry fixed effects at 4-digit SIC level and year fixed effects for all model 
specifications. Collateral missing dummy and number of lenders are included in the regressions 
but not reported here.  Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 






 (1) (2) (3) 
Partner S&P500  -0.0504*** -0.0937*** -0.0172 
 (-2.6378) (-3.5508) (-0.6234) 
Borrower S&P500 -0.2683***  
 (-8.3028)  
Firm characteristics   
Log (asset)  -0.1030*** -0.1102*** -0.1326*** 
 (-7.9024) (-7.2451) (-4.7769) 
MTB -0.0860*** -0.0430*** -0.1489*** 
 (-7.6304) (-3.3896) (-6.2945) 
Leverage 0.7482*** 0.6811*** 0.8791*** 
 (12.3566) (10.5467) (5.8668) 
Tangibility -0.1788** -0.2640*** -0.0311 
 (-2.1155) (-2.5968) (-0.1626) 
Profitability -1.1162*** -0.9868*** -1.2915*** 
 (-6.4991) (-5.2372) (-3.0844) 
Z-score -0.0251*** -0.0180** -0.0859** 
 (-2.7484) (-2.0963) (-2.3800) 
Rating score  -0.0130*** -0.0018 -0.0437*** 
 (-3.2360) (-0.3812) (-4.0855) 
Loan characteristics   
Log (facility amount)  -0.0779*** -0.0634*** -0.1046*** 
 (-6.1782) (-4.3836) (-4.7631) 
Log (maturity) 0.0607*** 0.0269 0.0559*** 
 (4.5834) (1.5358) (3.0372) 
Collateral 0.5911*** 0.5505*** 0.7566*** 
 (22.5422) (17.7598) (12.1732) 
Syndication -0.1109*** -0.1347*** 0.1352 
 (-2.8572) (-3.4440) (0.4662) 
Covenant 0.0635*** -0.0556** 0.1024*** 
 (2.8512) (-2.0245) (2.7226) 
Constant 5.8336*** 5.9833*** 5.8935*** 
 (50.1375) (45.8351) (15.0101) 
   
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects  YES YES YES 
   
N 4,165 2,654 1,511 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7182 0.5876 0.7043  
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Table 8.   Effect of alliance network centrality 
      on bank loan spread 
 
This table represents regression results relating bank loan spread and the dominance position of 
alliance networks. The dependent variable is log AISD (all-in spread drawn). The main 
explanatory variables are firms’ relative network positions, measured using three centrality 
measurements: ‘Degree’, ‘Betweenness’, and ‘Eigenvector’. Columns 1–3 report the raw network 
measures and Columns 4–6 report the residual network measures, which are obtained from 
regressing raw network measures on a group of firm and industry-level characteristics. Variable 
definitions and measures are reported in Appendix. We control for various firm-specific and loan-
specific characteristics, and include industry fixed effects at 4-digit SIC level and year fixed 
effects for all model specifications. Collateral missing dummy and number of lenders are included 
in the regressions but not reported here. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: AISD in Logs
   Raw Network measures Residual network measures 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Degree  -1.5953*    -1.4868*    
  (-1.7909)    (-1.7130)    
Betweenness   -0.1479**      -0.1453**   
   (-2.0609)      (-2.0213)   
Eigenvector     0.0019     0.0005 
     (0.4159)     (0.1110) 
Firm characteristics         
Log  (asset)  -0.1572*** -0.1590*** -0.1633*** -0.1550*** -0.1553***  -0.1568*** 
  (-12.8598) (-13.1940) (-13.4688) (-12.5596) (-12.5786)  (-12.6177) 
MTB  -0.0953*** -0.0956*** -0.0956*** -0.0920*** -0.0915***  -0.0905*** 
  (-8.2980) (-8.3037) (-8.3079) (-7.8600) (-7.8250)  (-7.7658) 
Leverage  0.7997*** 0.8001*** 0.8056*** 0.7909*** 0.7907***  0.7954*** 
  (12.9944) (13.0176) (13.0834) (12.5615) (12.5688)  (12.6197) 
Tangibility -0.1936**  -0.1936** -0.1881** -0.2204** -0.2210**  -0.2162** 
  (-2.2582) (-2.2587) (-2.1933) (-2.4423) (-2.4500)  (-2.3954) 
Profitability -1.1064*** -1.1069*** -1.1149*** -1.1643*** -1.1638*** -1.1711*** 
  (-6.2262) (-6.2262) (-6.2638) (-6.4414) (-6.4351)  (-6.4703) 
Z-score  -0.0265*** -0.0262*** -0.0261***  -0.0257**  -0.0255**  -0.0254** 
  (-2.6236) (-2.6096) (-2.5830) (-2.5628) (-2.5557)  (-2.5275) 
Rating  score  -0.0170*** -0.0169*** -0.0168*** -0.0170*** -0.0169***  -0.0169*** 
  (-4.2584) (-4.2206) (-4.2008) (-4.1826) (-4.1522)  (-4.1402) 
Loan characteristics         
Log  (facility  amount)  -0.0707*** -0.0701*** -0.0705*** -0.0730*** -0.0725***  -0.0729*** 
  (-5.4968) (-5.4523) (-5.4846) (-5.4648) (-5.4260)  (-5.4467) 
Log  (maturity)  0.0663*** 0.0658*** 0.0665*** 0.0653*** 0.0649***  0.0656*** 
  (4.9172) (4.8773) (4.9228) (4.6908) (4.6579)  (4.6996) 
Collateral  0.5996*** 0.6010*** 0.5996*** 0.6001*** 0.6015***  0.6003*** 
  (22.7680) (22.7843) (22.7242) (21.9120) (21.9332)  (21.8845) 
Syndication  -0.0832** -0.0843** -0.0840** -0.0963** -0.0974**  -0.0974** 
  (-2.0860) (-2.1161) (-2.1017) (-2.3794) (-2.4094)  (-2.4004) 
Covenant  0.0632*** 0.0621*** 0.0621*** 0.0625*** 0.0616***  0.0617*** 
  (2.7773) (2.7320) (2.7286) (2.6344) (2.5933)  (2.5968) 
Constant  6.0847*** 6.0358*** 6.0396*** 6.0239*** 6.0349***  6.0256*** 
  (51.0941) (51.7720) (51.8735) (50.5631) (51.0835)  (51.0780) 
         
Year  fixed  effects  YES YES YES YES YES  YES 
Industry fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
         
N  4,124 4,124 4,124 3,896 3,896  3,896 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.7180 0.7178 0.7175 0.7145 0.7144  0.7141 
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Table 9.   Effect of alliance on other loan contract terms 
 
This table represents regression results relating alliance dummy and two loan contract terms: 
collateral and loan maturity. Collateral is a dummy variable, capturing whether the loan is secured 
by collateral. Column 1 reports the probit estimation of the probability of pledging collateral. 
Column 2 reports the marginal effect of the probit estimators. Column 3–5 are Poisson regressions 
with three covenant intensity indexes as dependent variables. We control for various firm-level 
and loan-level characteristics. Variable definitions and measures are reported in Appendix. We 
control for various firm-specific and loan-specific characteristics, and include industry fixed 
effects at 4-digit SIC level and year fixed effects for all model specifications. Robust t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Independent Variable  Dependent Variables 
   Collateral  Collateral Overall General  Financial 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Alliance dummy  -0.0656*  -0.0160*  -0.0364***  -0.0358**  -0.0374** 
  (-1.6853)  (-1.6853)  (-2.7826) (-2.4406) (-2.4227) 
Firm characteristics         
Log (asset)  -0.4396***  -0.1055***  -0.0413***  -0.0180**  -0.0885*** 
 (-18.9182)  (-18.9182)  (-6.1811)  (-2.3867)  (-11.4047) 
MTB -0.0858***  -0.0206***  -0.0363***  -0.0444***  -0.0225** 
  (-3.7322)  (-3.7322)  (-4.6376) (-4.8066) (-2.5043) 
Leverage 2.0847***  0.5001***  0.1524***  0.2105***  0.0316 
  (17.5031)  (17.5031)  (4.7809) (5.7315) (0.8212) 
Tangibility -1.0864***  -0.2606*** -0.0534 -0.1278*** 0.0791* 
 (-7.7767)  (-7.7767)  (-1.2801)  (-2.6467)  (1.6661) 
Profitability  -2.2545***  -0.5408***  0.4777*** 0.5121*** 0.4118*** 
  (-6.5630)  (-6.5630)  (4.8377) (4.3493) (3.4729) 
Z-score -0.2061***  -0.0494***  -0.0045  -0.0209***  0.0278*** 
 (-7.8120)  (-7.8120)  (-0.8799)  (-3.1062)  (4.0128) 
Rating score  0.0035  0.0008  -0.0017  0.0018  -0.0077*** 
 (0.5124)  (0.5124)  (-0.7671)  (0.7490)  (-2.8387) 
Loan characteristics         
Log  (facility  amount)  -0.1619***  -0.0388***  0.0695*** 0.0908*** 0.0282*** 
 (-7.4254)  (-7.4254)  (10.7278)  (12.1657)  (3.7573) 
Log  (maturity)  0.4035***  0.0968***  0.1300*** 0.1399*** 0.1140*** 
  (15.1429)  (15.1429)  (13.1673) (12.1360) (10.2457) 
Collateral /  /  0.2121***  0.3093***  0.0182 
 /  /  (15.6451)  (19.6956)  (1.1510) 
Syndication  0.2587***  0.0680***  0.6564*** 1.0577*** 0.1901*** 
 (3.9167)  (3.9167)  (25.2355)  (24.5692)  (7.3983) 
Covenant  -0.0172  -0.0041  / / / 
  (-0.3332)  (-0.3332)  / / / 
Constant  3.4062***  /  -4.9035*** -5.9650*** -5.0636*** 
 (10.7809)  /  (-9.1270)  (-10.1448)  (-5.0377) 
         
Year fixed effects  YES  YES  YES 
YES 
YES YES 
Industry fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
         
N  11,982  11,982  16,812 16,812 16,812 
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Appendix 
Measures and variable definitions 
 
Variables Variable  Definitions 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics
7 
Asset  Total asset: (data6) 
Leverage  Total debts including long-term debt and short term debt over firm book 
assets: (data34+data9)/data6 
MTB  Raito of market value of the firm over book value of assets:(data6-
data60+data25*data199)/data6 
Tangibility  Net property, plant, and equipment plus inventories over asset: 
data8/data6 
Profitability EBITDA  over  total assets: data13/data6 
Z-score Modified  Altman’s (1968) Z-score 1⁄4 (1.2 working capital+1.4 retained 
earnings+3.3 EBIT+0.999sales)/total assets 1⁄4 (1.2 
data179+1.4data36+3.3data170+0.999data12)/ data6. 
Rating score  We assign an Aaa rating a value of 10, a Aa rating a value of 9, a A rating a 
value of 8, a Bbb rating a value of 7, a Bb rating a value of 6, a B rating a 
value of 5, a Ccc rating a value of 4, a Cc rating a value of 3, a C rating a 
value of 2, a D class rating a value of 1, and 0 for not-rated firms.  
Partner S&P500   Dummy variable equal to one if a borrowing firm has allied with an S&P500 
firm during 3 years preceding the loan origination, zero otherwise 
Borrower S&P500   Dummy variable equal to one if a borrowing firm itself has been ranked as 
S&P500 during 3 years preceding the loan origination, zero otherwise 
Panel B: Loan Characteristics 
AISD  All in spread drawn obtained from Dealscan, it is defined as the loan spread 
over LIBOR at the time of the loan origination 
Facility amount  Loan facility amount, measured in million dollars 
Maturity  Loan maturity measured in months  
Collateral  Dummy variable equals to one if the loan is secured by collaterals, zero 
otherwise 
Syndication  Dummy variable equal to one if the loan is syndicated, zero otherwise 
Covenants  Dummy variable equal to one if the loan is combined with any covenants, 
zero otherwise 
Covenant intensity  total number of covenants included in the loan contract 
General covenants 
intensity 
total number of general covenants in the loan contract 
Financial covenants 
intensity 
total number of financial covenants in the loan contract 
Lender number  total number of lenders in a loan facility 
Panel C: Alliance Measures
8 
Alliance dummy  Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has at least one alliance during 3 
years before loan origination, zero otherwise  
Alliance number  Number of alliances a firm has during 3 years before loan origination 
Degree centrality  A ratio of actual alliance linkages over the maximum linkages the firm could 
have during three years before loan origination 
Betweenness centrality   Proportion of shortest paths between other firms in the alliance network 
that must pass through a focal firm 
Eigenvector centrality  The eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue of the standardized 
matrix of the network, it captures the extent to which a firm is connected 
with other well-networked firms.  
 
                                                 
7 All data times are from Compustat annual industry data file. 
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